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 West German Constitutionalism
 and Church-State Relations
 by  Donald P. Kommers
 University of Notre Dame
 Introduction
 The complex structure of church-state relations in West Germany
 arises out of numerous provisions of the Basic Law that combine
 features of both separation and accommodation. The Basic Law's
 separationist features are expressed in various guarantees of
 religious liberty and in the ban on the establishment of a state
 church. Its accommodationist features appear in constitutional
 provisions on religious education as well as in articles, taken over
 from the Weimar Constitution, that confer upon the established
 churches a special juridical status enjoyed by no other nongovern
 mental entity.1 The arguably diverse goals of the religion clauses
 are difficult to reconcile, creating dilemmas similar to problems
 raised by the tension between the "establishment" and "free
 exercise" clauses of the United States Constitution. In the German
 understanding, however, these dilemmas collapse under the weight
 of an interpretative approach that seeks to bring divergent clauses
 into harmony with one another and with the values of the Basic
 Law as a whole.
 In the interest of both clarity and brevity, I have organized this
 essay around three principles that define the basic structure of
 church-state relations in West Germany, namely, neutrality,
 autonomy, and accommodation. Neutrality steers the state away
 from identification with the church and commands it to treat all
 religions equally under the law; autonomy, which is really a
 subcategory of neutrality, expresses the idea that church and state
 must remain free to govern their affairs independently of each
 other; accommodation, finally, not only permits but also requires
 certain connections or levels of cooperation between church and
 state. The three concepts, like the religion clauses, join one another
 in uneasy collaboration. In the hands of the Federal Constitutional
 Court, however, they have advanced into a relationship of
 reciprocity and mutual fertilization.
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 Neutrality
 After examining all the religion clauses of the Basic Law, including
 the Weimar articles, the Federal Constitutional Court concluded,
 in a seminal case, that the West German state, "as the home of all
 citizens, is bound by ideological and religious neutrality."2 The
 theme of neutrality resonates through the constitutional law of
 church-state relations in the Federal Republic. A particular judi
 cial vision of the human personality evokes this theme. Religion is
 so central to human existence, the Federal Constitutional Court has
 suggested, that any interference with religious belief or its
 expression, or any display of partiality for a given belief or set of
 beliefs, would violate the principle of human dignity that the
 state is bound, under Article 1, "to respect and protect." After all,
 religious belief or other conviction held with the force of religious
 faith deals with ultimate values, touching the very core of the
 human personality.
 Article 4 is the cornerstone of the Basic Law's religious liberty
 provisions. It guarantees "freedom of faith, conscience, and creed,
 religious or ideological," secures the "undisturbed practice of
 religion," and upholds the right of conscientious objection to
 military service. Unlike several other guaranteed rights, and
 apart from the paragraph on conscientious objection, Article 4 is
 cast in absolute terms: it contains no reservation clause limiting
 freedom of religious belief or exercise, which means that religious
 expression can be regulated only by some other value explicitly set
 forth in the Constitution.3 In this respect, as implied in previous
 remarks, the Basic Law accords a higher level of protection to
 religious belief than to expression based on political, social, or
 economic considerations.
 As judicially defined, the concept of neutrality requires both
 separation of church and state and tolerance of religious diversity.
 The constitutional command that "[tjhere shall be no state church"
 embraces the core principle of separation although, as we shall see
 below, its interpretation has avoided the rigid separatism of
 American constitutional theory. The principle of tolerance, on the
 other hand, obliges the state to respect and protect all manner of
 religious belief. Accordingly, the Federal Constitutional Court has
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 ruled that courts may not compel witnesses to take religious oaths
 against their will, that the state may not impose a criminal
 penalty on a husband who allowed his wife to die because of her
 refusal on religious grounds to accept a blood transfusion, and that
 an administrative judge violated a Jewish lawyer's right to
 freedom of conscience when he refused at the latter's request to
 remove from the courtroom a conspicuously displayed crucifix.4
 In the German understanding of neutrality, however, the principle
 of tolerance does not imply indifference to religious belief or its
 exercise, for freedom of religion, like other fundamental rights, is
 both negative and positive in character. As the constitutional
 rulings in the previous paragraph indicate, the negativity of the
 right prevents the state from invading the domain of religious
 belief. Its positivity, on the other hand, requires the state affirma
 tively to ensure that the social and cultural milieu is conducive to
 the expression of religiously inspired thought and activity. If
 religion is so crucially important to the wholeness of life,
 furnishing the basis of linkage to transcendent values—that is, if it
 is an identity-defining attribute of personhood—then under the
 order of values propounded in the Basic Law the proper constitu
 tionalist agenda is the creation of an environment that encourages
 persons to manifest their religious personalities. In short, the state
 should make it easy and not hard for them to practice their
 religion; they should not have to make sacrifices to exercise the
 fundamental right of religious freedom.
 What constitutes the practice or exercise of religion was partially
 settled in the Rumpelkammer case,5 another seminal decision in the
 church-state area. The case arose in response to a court order
 prohibiting Catholic clergymen from publicizing, in the pulpit or
 the religious press, a charitable clothing drive undertaken by a
 Catholic youth association for the benefit of needy young people in
 underdeveloped countries. A scrap dealer claimed that the youth
 group's activity damaged his business in violation of the civil code.
 In sustaining the complaint against the judicial decree, the
 Constitutional Court argued that the "exercise of religion" must be
 "expansively interpreted" to include the church's own conception of
 what constitutes religious activity if religious freedom is to enjoy
 adequate breathing space in society.
This content downloaded from 129.74.89.102 on Tue, 16 Jul 2019 16:19:19 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 German Politics & Society
 The court defended its ruling as a natural consequence of the
 religiously neutral state. This key passage is worth quoting in full:
 In determining what is to be regarded as the free
 exercise of religion, we must consider the self-image
 of the [relevant] religious or ideological commu
 nity. Indeed, the state, which [strives to remain]
 neutral in religious matters, must interpret basic
 constitutional concepts in terms of neutral, gener
 ally applicable viewpoints and not on the basis of
 viewpoints associated with a particular confession
 or creed. However, in a pluralistic society where
 the legal order considers the religious or ideologi
 cal self-image [of the individual] as well as the
 self-image of those performing rituals associated
 with a particular belief, the state would violate
 the independence of ideological associations and
 their internal freedom to organize accorded by the
 Constitution if it did not consider the way these
 associations see themselves when interpreting reli
 gious activity resulting from a specific confession or
 creed.6
 The Rumpelkammer court thus concluded that this particular
 charitable collection, far from being a "mere social transaction,"
 constituted an act of "Christian love" carried out "within the broad
 framework of religious consciousness." In an earlier case, however,
 the court was careful to point out that not all church activities fall
 within the protection of Article 4. For example, churches may be
 required to pay taxes on the sale of food and drink or on the rental
 of rooms on church property.7 The manifest difficulty in distin
 guishing between church activities based on belief and those
 calling for normal regulation in the public interest should not
 obscure the court's general view that any arguably religious cause is
 presumptively immune from burdensome state regulations.
 The neutrality demanded of the state in its treatment of religion
 finds further expression, finally, in several antidiscrimination
 clauses of the Basic Law. The framers clearly had the Nazi experi
 ence in mind when they prohibited, in Article 3 (3), the conferral of
 any benefit or burden on any person "because of... his religious or
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 political opinions." Article 33 (3) likewise bans discrimination
 against any civil or public servant "by reason of his adherence or
 nonadherence to a denomination or ideology." The Weimar provi
 sions reinforce these antidiscriminatory injunctions by requiring
 that the "enjoyment of civil and political rights and eligibility for
 public office shall be independent of religious creed," by the
 instruction that "[n]o person may be compelled to perform any
 religious act. . . or to participate in religious exercises," and by the
 command that "[n]o one shall be bound to disclose his religious
 convictions." The nondisclosure clause appears to conflict with the
 Basic Law's directive under Article 7 (3) that religious instruction
 "form part of the ordinary curriculum in state and municipal
 schools." That teachers may constitutionally refuse to conduct
 classes in religion could easily lead to disclosure of one's religious
 views, but here too the Constitutional Court strains to reconcile
 competing rights and values.
 Autonomy
 Just as the state may not prefer one religion or religious belief over
 another it may not intervene in the affairs of the church. One of the
 Weimar provisions (Article 137 [3]) directs "[ejvery religious
 community [to] regulate and administer its affairs independently
 within the limits of law valid for all," a policy that extends from
 the selection of church officials to the management of church
 related institutions. As the Divided Parish case underlined, citing
 the clause just mentioned, "Churches are institutions endowed with
 the right to self-determination."8 Accordingly, the Parish court
 refused to review a decision by church authorities to split a
 religious community served by one parish into two separate
 parishes. The decision was an internal church affair, said the
 court, and not an exercise of "public authority," thereby making
 unavailable any judicial redress of constitutional complaints based
 on an asserted violation of certain fundamental rights.
 Would the principle of self-determination be sustained in the event
 that a religious community impeded the ability of a pastor to hold
 a seat in the state or federal parliament? This issue faced Bremen's
 constitutional court when called upon to decide whether the state's
 Protestant church could constitutionally require one of its ministers
 to resign his church office and take a leave of absence during the
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 time for which he was elected. The court invalidated the church
 rule on both state and federal constitutional grounds. For present
 purposes it is sufficient to mention that Article 48 (2) of the Basic
 Law provides that "no person may be prevented from accepting and
 exercising the office of an [elected] deputy [to the Bundestag]." On
 appeal the Federal Constitutional Court quashed the decision of
 the state court, holding that there was no conflict between the
 church rule and Article 48 and that the church was free in any
 event to decide when and under what conditions its ministers could
 best carry out their spiritual functions.9 Indeed, the court seemed
 impressed with the church's own determination not to mix the
 functions of church and state.
 In other situations it has not been so easy to draw a clear line
 between the sacred and the secular. The relevant clause of the
 Weimar Constitution guarantees the church's autonomy "within
 the limits of the law valid for all," a clause that subjects the
 church and its institutions to all valid laws enacted in pursuit of
 the general welfare. Cases involving labor relations and the
 management of institutions loosely associated with the church
 have caused the greatest difficulty here. Do trade unionists have
 the right to enter church institutions such as charitable founda
 tions, nursing homes, and hospitals in order to distribute leaflets
 and other information pertaining to union membership and the
 rights of workers? May a state require all hospitals, including
 those under religious auspices, to adopt specified accounting and
 managerial practices? May a hospital run by a Catholic order of
 nuns prefer its own religiously based system of staff codetermina
 tion over the one prescribed by state law? May a Catholic hospital
 dismiss a physician known for his advocacy of the right to
 abortion?
 In all of these cases, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled in favor
 of the churches and against the applicable state law, in three
 instances overruling decisions of the Federal Labor Court.10 Any
 state policy, the court suggested, that compromises the mission of
 the church, detracts from its religious identity, or undermines its
 public credibility as a religious institution committed to a given
 way of life, interferes with the autonomy of the church in violation
 of the Basic Law. The result in these cases must be understood in
 terms of the Constitutional Court's image of the church as a copart
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 ner with the state in caring for the needs of its citizens. Because it
 provides for a people's spiritual needs, "the church is crucially
 important to the life of the state and society,"11 and thus deserves a
 special margin of appreciation when its institutional claims
 conflict with otherwise valid state law. This perspective does not
 diminish the importance of the state's own public policies. If
 otherwise valid state interests can be justified by compelling social
 or economic reasons and do not affect core church functions or the
 self-identity of institutions under the church's control, they are
 likely to be upheld.
 The policy of nonintervention, however, does not reach as far as the
 American principle of nonentanglement. Some supervision of the
 church is bound to occur within a constitutional order that confers a
 special legal status on religious associations, empowering them to
 exercise certain public functions. The church's autonomy is
 obviously limited to the extent that the discharge of these
 functions invites state regulation in the public interest. By the same
 token, when the church exercises authority conferred by law—e.g.,
 levying taxes on its members—state supervision may be necessary
 for the proper administration of the resulting rules. It may also be
 necessary, as noted below, to insure that the church administers a
 state sanctioned practice so as not to interfere with the free exercise
 of religion.
 Accommodation
 The scheme of church-state relations under the Basic Law of the
 Federal Republic of Germany conforms to a deeply rooted German
 tradition. In this tradition, which emphasized the complementar
 ity if not the unity of a people's spiritual and physical existence,
 the church enjoyed a rank coordinate with the state in the
 governance of society. As institutions of equal rank within what
 was assumed to be a common universal community, they ordered
 their joint endeavors and settled their disputes by means of
 concordats or treaties, a practice that continues to this day.
 Although the theory of coordination would be eclipsed in the course
 of time by the rising tide of rationalism and secularism, leading to
 the complete supremacy of the state in public affairs, the churches
 would in the twentieth century retain many of their old connections
 to the political city.12
This content downloaded from 129.74.89.102 on Tue, 16 Jul 2019 16:19:19 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 German Politics & Society
 Thus, as noted at the outset, West Germany combines elements of
 both separation and accommodation. The Basic Law prohibits the
 establishment of a state church—its separationist tilt—but it
 nevertheless confers upon religious groups the status of "corporate
 bodies under public law," in which capacity they "shall be entitled
 to levy taxes [on wage earners] in accordance with the state (Land)
 law on the basis of civil taxation lists." In addition, the
 Constitution reaffirms the right of the church to own property, to
 establish affiliated institutions, and to receive "state contribu
 tions" as prescribed by law. It also obliges the state to recognize
 Sunday and other religious holidays as "days ... of spiritual
 edification," and guarantees the church's right to provide religious
 services, when needed, in prisons, hospitals, and other public
 institutions. These provisions of the Weimar Constitution, carried
 over into the Basic Law, are best understood in the light of history,
 that is, not only as an effort to secure the autonomy of the church in
 the face of Bismarck's Kulturkampf but also to compensate the
 church for the financial losses it had sustained by the state's
 seizure of church property and the dissolution of religious orders
 and congregations.
 The Basic Law itself provides for still other connections between
 church and state. Article 7, although placing the "entire educa
 tional system under state supervision," confers upon parents the
 "right to decide whether [their children] shall receive religious
 instruction," makes such instruction "a part of the ordinary
 curriculum in state and municipal schools," and permits the estab
 lishment, subject to state approval, of publicly supported denomi
 national schools. Religious instruction is not permitted in purely
 secular schools, although in other public or interdenominational
 schools such instruction "shall be given in accordance with the
 tenets of the religious communities." As noted above, however,
 parents may decline to have their children attend classes in
 religion, just as the Basic Law bars the state from compelling a
 teacher to conduct such classes.
 In the light of their reserved power over the fields of culture and
 education, the states (Lander) are free to adopt policies based on
 their various religious and political traditions. Nearly all the
 state governments have negotiated treaties or concordats with the
 Protestant churches and the Vatican—in recent years such treaties
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 have been concluded with the Jewish community and other
 religious groups—covering such matters as the legal status of
 churches, religious education in the public schools, construction of
 confessional schools, observance of religious holidays, maintenance
 of church property, appointment of bishops, and dismissal of
 members of theological faculties.13 Needless to say, any detailed
 reference to these church-state agreements, or to the decisions of
 state constitutional courts interpreting them, would take us far
 afield. It is sufficient to note that any comprehensive treatment of
 church-state relations in West Germany would have to take this
 massive body of law into account.
 Two problems, nevertheless, have warranted the special attention
 of the Federal Constitutional Court, one dealing with the church
 tax and the other with religious activities in state schools. The
 typical complaint against the church tax is that its application to
 a particular person violates freedom of conscience or religion.
 Invariably, the court strikes down the tax when applied to
 "unchurched" persons or to others who have given formal notice of
 their withdrawal from the church. The system itself, however, is
 beyond constitutional challenge. As presently operated, state
 revenue offices collect the tax on behalf of the churches and then
 distribute the proceeds to the major denominations proportionate to
 their respective memberships. The tax takes the form of an eight to
 ten percent surcharge, withheld by the employer, on a wage
 earner's net income tax, but here too the court has exercised
 considerable vigilance, in one case nullifying the levy on the income
 of the spouse who filed a joint income tax return with his
 "churched" wife but who himself was not a member of the church.14
 The educational context has also been a fertile source of
 constitutional rulings. As with the church tax, religious education
 is sanctioned by the Constitution; it enjoys a legitimate place
 within the public school curriculum so long as the state respects the
 religious or nonreligious choices of students and teachers. Indeed,
 most constitutional commentators defend such instruction as a
 manifestation of the free exercise of religion. As the Concordat case
 made clear, however, freedom of religion does not obligate the
 state to establish confessional schools.15 It may, if it chooses, even
 in opposition to a national treaty, establish interdenominational
 schools as the standard form of elementary and secondary education
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 so long as the need for religious education can be met within this
 framework. The problem is that this need cannot as a practical
 matter be extended to all religious groups. Small Christian sects
 often do not meet those imperatives of size and durability that
 would constitutionally entitle them to religious instruction in public
 schools. Whether and to what extent religious instruction or
 separate confessional schools shall be provided for some 300,000
 Moslem students—the children of foreign workers resident in West
 Germany—is presently a troubling constitutional issue.
 Equally troubling is the problem of religious influences or practices
 outside the structure of formal religious education. Two cases are
 considerably important here. In the first, the Constitutional Court
 upheld the right of the state to establish interdenominational
 schools with a general Christian orientation; in the second, it
 sustained the validity of a nondenominational prayer in such
 schools. In each case the court sought to reconcile the
 "constitutional value of [religious] tolerance" with the
 "safeguarding of state independence in matters of school organiza
 tion." Christian references within the context of secular courses,
 said the court, do "not refer to the truth of belief" but rather to "the
 recognition of Christianity as a formative cultural and educational
 fact." The court cautioned, however, that public schools may not be
 transformed into "missionary schools," "may not require any
 commitment to articles of Christian faith," and must "remain open
 to other ideological and religious ideas." In the prayer case too,
 said the court, tolerance required equal concern and respect for the
 rights of believers and unbelievers; participation in prayer must be
 voluntary and the exercise ordered in such a way as to preserve the
 rights of all. As in most cases such as this, the court scrutinizes the
 facts carefully in an effort to reconcile the negative right to be free
 of religious compulsion with the positive right to religious
 expression.16
 Conclusion
 The German perspective on church-state relations, as this brief
 survey shows, contrasts sharply with the official American
 position, which is one largely of dogmatic separation. Indeed, any
 attempt in Germany to drive church and state into sharply divided
 10
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 compartments, where the twain shall never meet, would in the
 prevailing view seriously offend the freedom to practice one's
 religion. An echo of this prevailing German attitude can be heard
 in those American constitutional cases where the Supreme Court
 has had to balance the value of nonestablishment against claims
 asserted under the free exercise clause.
 Both German and American constitutionalism require the state to be
 neutral with respect to religion, but neutrality means different
 things in the two systems. To Americans neutrality means tolera
 tion and no public support; to Germans it means encouragement and
 at least some public support. The American perspective reflects an
 essentially negative view of religion's role in the nation's public
 life, whereas the German perspective sees religion as a needed
 participant in the public sphere. Finally, the Basic Law adheres to
 the principle of separation, but in the German understanding of the
 term this does not imply the impenetrable wall of disassociation
 erected in American constitutional law. The German system permits
 and even encourages a measurable degree of cooperation between
 throne and altar so long as each respects the autonomy of the other
 and the state favors no one religion over another.
 West Germany provides Americans with an interesting model of
 how a liberal, pluralistic democracy—and a highly secularized
 one at that—might order the relationship between church and
 state. Indeed, the accommodationist stance of German constitu
 tional law is often defended as a means of maintaining pluralism
 and diversity in the face of powerful secularizing trends toward
 social uniformity and moral rootlessness. Secular critics of the
 current modus vivendi have pointed out, however, that the
 church's financial connection to the state allows it to exert
 excessive influence in the political realm. Some religious critics, on
 the other hand, see the influence running the other way, with the
 church serving as a captive of the liberal state, aligning itself with
 existing power structures and compromising its spiritual mission.
 There is probably some truth in both propositions. Still, the system
 appears to work to the benefit of both church and state and in the
 absence of the agitated political strife often stirred up by the
 religious presence in American politics. Church and state are
 separate in Germany but no Berlin wall divides them. Their
 11
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 'Article 140 of the Basic Law incorporates Articles 136, 137, 138,
 139, and 141 of the Weimar Constitution of 1919. These articles
 reaffirm various liberties of conscience and specify in considerable
 detail the rights and privileges of religious organizations. Under
 Article 140, the Weimar articles constitute "an integral part of this
 Basic Law," placing them on the same plane of constitutional
 legality and protection as any other provision of the Basic Law.
 2See Church Construction Tax Case, Judgment of December 14,1965,
 19 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts (hereafter cited
 as BVerfGE), p. 216.
 3In the Tobacco-Atheist case, for example, the Federal
 Constitutional Court sustained the denial of parole to a prisoner, an
 ex-Nazi stormtrooper, because he promised to reward his fellow
 inmates with packages of tobacco if they would abandon their
 religious faith. The Court felt that such tactics, which appeal to
 the lowest of human instincts, violated the Basic Law's "general
 order of values," especially the principle of human dignity. "A
 person who exploits the special circumstances of penal servitude
 and promises and rewards someone with luxury goods in order to
 make him renounce his beliefs," said the Court, "does not enjoy the
 benefit of the protection of Art. 4, Sec. 1, of the Basic Law." See 12
 BVerfGE 4-5 (1960). The quotation is from the English translation
 of this case, which appears in Walter F. Murphy and Joseph
 Tanenhaus, Comparative Constitutional Law (New York: St.
 Martin's Press, 1977), p. 467.
 4See, respectively, Witness Oath Case, 33 BVerfGE 23 (1972), Blood
 Transfusion Case, 32 BVerfGE 98 (1971), and Crucifix Case, 35
 BVerfGE 366 (1973).
 524 BVerfGE 236 (1968).
 6Ibid., pp. 247-248. The translation of this passage has been taken
 from Donald P. Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the
 Federal Republic of Germany (Durham and London: Duke
 University Press, 1989), p. 449.
 nWatch Tower Bible and Tract Society Case, 19 BVerfGE 229 (1965).
 818 BVerfGE 385 (1965).
 9Bremen Evangelical Church Case, 42 BVerfGE 312 (1976).
 10See, respectively, Union Recruiting Case, 57 BVerfGE 220 (1981),
 Marien Hospital Case, 53 BVerfGE 366 (1980), Goch Hospital Case,
 46 BVerfGE 73 (1977), and St. Elizabeth Hospital Case, 70 BVerfGE
 138 (1985).
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 nSee Evangelical Church Case, supra note 9 at 331.
 12An excellent treatment of the "coordination theory" and its
 contemporary manifestations, including sharp criticisms of the
 theory, is contained in Klaus G. Meyer-Teschendorf, Staat und
 Kirche itn pluralistischen Gemeinwesen (Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr
 [Paul Siebeck], 1979, pp. 1-52.
 I3The terms and interpretation of these treaties embrace a large
 portion of Staatskirchenrecht, a major subject of legal study in
 Germany often taught by constitutional lawyers. The best and most
 up-to-date study of these church-state agreements is Joseph Listl,
 Die Konkordate und Kirchenvertriige in der Bundesrepublik
 Deutschland. 2 vols. (Berlin: Duncker & Humbolt, 1987).
 14For a summary of the leading cases, see Ingo von Munch,
 Grundgesetz Kommentar, second edition (Munich: Verlag C. H.
 Beck, 1983), vol. 3, pp. 1326-1334.
 156 BVerfGE 309 (1957).
 16The two cases are the Interdenominational School Case, 41
 BVerfGE 29 (1975) and School Prayer Case, 52 BVerfGE 223 (1979).
 An English translation of these cases appears in Kommers, supra
 note 6, at pp. 466-477.
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